The Civil Air Patrol National Historical Journal is published quarterly by professional volunteer staff. As academic historians by trade, we recognize the demand for quality publications reflecting a variety of interests to Civil Air Patrol readers, and strive to offer the best in feature and thought provoking articles. We trust you will enjoy what the e-journal has to offer, and will consider contributing to the mission of our staff in providing a forum for the great traditions our organization enjoys.

A Different Legacy

A unique look at the late Gill Robb Wilson, who served as the first executive officer of the Civil Air Patrol, and after whom the highest senior member professional development award is named written by his granddaughter, Jill Robb Paulson.

Nearly on a whim I was asked to write an article about curious remembrances of my grandfather, Gill Robb Wilson. After all, who better to reminisce about him than his namesake, Jill Robb? Truth be told, I’m named after my grandfather because I’m the youngest of three girls, which means the grandmothers’ names were taken by the time I appeared. My sisters knew him far better than I (when they were small he bought a house in our neighborhood so he could be near them). After I was born, he moved—to the opposite coast! The woes of being the baby in the family meant many things, and worst of all at the time (or so I believed) is that I did not get the awesome gifts from him that my sisters did! On one particular occasion, after a speaking engagement in Oklahoma, officials there offered him anything from the state as a token of their appreciation. Of all things, he took a pony as a gift for my elder sister. A pony! Again, I felt the pain of being the youngest!

My eldest sister had the benefit of receiving books with personal inscriptions from him, like this partial one from the inside cover of The Airman’s World:

“It is Christmas Eve, 1957 and I’m giving Mommy one of these little books. It will mean nothing to you now and may not even mean much when you are grown because the world changes rapidly and the things this book talks about will seem as old fashioned to you as the covered wagons seemed to me when I was your age. Nonetheless, it will illustrate certain points that have meaning in any age. One of them is consciousness of your heritage. You have behind you a long line of ancestors who explored the frontiers wherever they found them—on land, on sea or in the air. They never surrendered to fear and they fought for freedom—not only their own but everyone’s.”
The second thing this book talks about is God. I don’t know any more about God than anyone else, but I have a certainty that there is a supreme intelligence behind the universe and where there is intelligence there must be personality. And this book talks about happiness. To make a living is one thing, but it is a much greater thing to make a life, and a good life can’t be made out of fear and complaint.”

My middle sister—whose pony arrives years later—also received a nice inscription in her copy of The Airman’s World:

“Granddaddy has spent most of his life about airplanes and affairs of the air age. It’s been fun to live with danger and challenge—a lot of laughs at himself and others. But the real fun has not been the flying itself but what the flying led—and will lead—to: the opportunity of humanity to know itself...you have a firm foundation under you. You don’t need a crown on your head to make you a queen. You were born free, so you don’t need money to make you wealthy. Your wealth is beyond what all the money in the world could buy. Be queenly to all but bow to none. Give of yourself and you will have made the greatest gift of all.”

Me? What did he write me? Nothing. Nada. Life as a tag-along can be so unfair! On the other hand, I did get his name, or at least his name modified for a girl (But really, how many girls do you know named Robb?) We even shared the same family nickname, which I will not divulge under any circumstances—certainly not here! The name is sufficient for me, however. Perhaps a name carries some incalculable and mysterious power—who knows? Continued on page 4

No Small Contribution

Lt Col Winton Adcock Jr. addresses the life and contributions of Harry K. Coffey, an early Civil Air Patrol pioneer in this excerpt from an historical monograph he composed in 2012. The complete monograph can be obtained with permission by contacting the author via the editor.

When Civil Air Patrol was created on December 1st, 1941, Harry Coffey was one of the three original national advisors. Along with General Carl “Tooey” Spaatz, known as the “Father of Strategic Bombing”, General “Hap” Arnold and Gill Robb Wilson, Harry Coffey played a significant role in the founding of Civil Air Patrol.

As the National Director for the Office of Civilian Defense, Fiorello LaGuardia, former Mayor of New York and World War I flying ace signed the formal order creating Civil Air Patrol on December 1st, 1941.
On December 9th, 1941, Coffey flew his twin engine plane to Washington, D.C. to meet with LaGuardia. Accompanying him was Leo G. Devaney, Oregon state aviation director, who LaGuardia appointed as Wing Commander for the state of Oregon. Coffey would become the third Wing Commander for Oregon, serving from July 1946 to April 1948. Two days after Pearl Harbor there was a universal suspension of private flying throughout the United States. Coffey received special approval and became one of the first Oregon private pilots to obtain federal war-time flying permission.

Coffey was the Northwest representative and one of five civilian members appointed on the general planning staff for Civil Air Patrol. He quickly became national coordinating officer. In that role he aided in setting up, organizing and manning bases that patrolled the Atlantic Coast, the Gulf of Mexico and the Mexican Border on anti-submarine patrol. He also organized the tow-target and tracking activities in support of anti-aircraft artillery training for the Fourth Air Force on the Pacific Coast.

Only five months after the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, a Life magazine article titled, “Civil Air Patrol - America’s private pilots are mobilized for war” told America about how the nation’s 100,000 civilian pilots had become the third arm of U.S. airpower. It described the latest assignment of patrolling U.S. coastlines. The article highlighted Civil Air Patrol pilots who volunteered their services for one to two weeks at a time and got one day off a week.

**Mexican Border Patrols**

General Walter Krueger, Commander of Southern Defense Command “Believing that surveillance of the Mexican Border from the air would be of value,” issued a request on July 24, 1942, “That Civil Air Patrol planes be provided the Southern Defense Command for that purpose.” Soon afterwards, Harry Coffey, began his role as coordinator of CAP border patrol and acquired data on people and equipment while establishing a close relationship with federal counter-espionage authorities in the area. He also worked with William E. Mueller, owner of Southwest Air Rangers to establish the Southern Liaison Patrol. Flying out of Biggs Field in El Paso, Texas, its mission was to monitor the border between El Paso and Mexico.

Between July 1942 and April 1944 Civil Air Patrol logged approximately 30,000 flight hours patrolling approximately 1,000 miles along the Texas border with Mexico. They often flew low enough to read the license plates of suspicious vehicles in the border area. By 1944, Civil Air Patrol had more than 125,000 active members in a working well established organization in 48 states. In addition, some 75,000 former members were serving in the armed forces or in war industries, having been better prepared as a result of their CAP experience. In just over three years, CAP had given aviation training to over 200,000. In 1944, the cadet program alone had over 65,000 cadets. In Oregon, Governor Earl Snell signed up as a full-fledged active member.

In a news release by Civil Air Patrol Headquarters on its third anniversary, CAP is credited for “keeping hometown airports open” and contributing to the future postwar development of private flying. It reports that fully a third of the 1,600 airports open would not be operating if not for the help and patronage of CAP, whose members built 81 airports with their own labor and made improvements to over 100 more at no cost to the Federal Government. Without CAP, it would have been necessary to ground private flying.

Civil Air Patrol’s biggest job at the time was to continue expansion of the cadet program and the training of volunteer instructors for military and pre-flight courses. The former was seen as a means of building up a reserve of pre-trained young men for the maintenance of American air power.

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1. Air Rescue Service, Military Air Transport Service Information letter, 1 July 1953
3. Oregonian, 10 Dec 1041 “Two Portlanders Get Call to Civil Air Patrol Parley” copy in appendix A
5. Life Magazine. Volume 12, number 17, dated April 27, 1942 pp 63,64, 66
Obscure facts about my grandfather

He loved dogs. As soon as he moved out of the parsonage until the day he died, he had dogs. His first dog was given to him by close friend Norman Schwarzkopf.

In the 1950’s his wife became Betty Crocker on TV, garnering almost as much publicity as her aviator spouse. In real life she wasn’t much of a cook.

He and Billy Mitchell were close friends. After being offered an aviation job in Hawaii, it was Billy Mitchell who urged him to stay put and be “a pattern maker” for aviation nationally.

A trip to Germany on 1936 convinced my grandfather that war was inevitable (a very unpopular notion at the time). He fought for years to convince a nation that war was coming and civil aviation MUST prepare. Many relationships, including the one with Charles Lindbergh, were strained by his unwavering stance. Yet during this trip, he wrote several loving cards and letters home, including one to his daughter on her birthday which ends, “Good night, darling. Your old man knows you’re perfect and hopes he can be a good father always.” He was.
Editors Column

On the eve of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in early December 1941, news of the creation of an all-civilian augmentation force under the leadership of U.S. Army Air Corps officers had barely hit the streets. Other than G. Robb Wilson, and a handful of aviators keen on the decisive role such a force could potentially play in national defense, it is fair to say that not many could have predicted such an egregious act of war that would ensue a week later.

The history of the Civil Air Patrol is as much about service and dedication to a cause as that of the armed forces of the day. The shared relationship to the U.S. Army Air Corps and later United States Air Force is inexorable—after all, its early leaders came from those organizations and were frankly some of the great pioneers of both aviation, as well as the application of air-power theory in warfare. We as historians should not underestimate the contributions of these individuals, and ought to regard them with high esteem as not just doers, but rather “thinkers” who molded and shaped our post WWII way of thinking with respect to the decisive role air-power would play in combat as a result of our experiences with it.

The idea that a civilian force of pilots could patrol the North American coast in search of enemy vessels, and potentially target them for destruction proved to be an attractive force multiplier for the war planners who saw every means necessary of defeating an aggressive enemy as being “necessary.” The following is the first installment of an essay I wrote while still in graduate school half a dozen years ago. Its content addresses some of the moral components of aerial bombing, as well as provides a platform for dialogue on how such a role reversal came to be, wherein civilian non-combatants were asked to target military combatants during war, and is thus historically relevant to CAP’s potential wartime missions.

A Systematic Analysis of Air Doctrine in WWII and The Changing Attitudes Towards Area Bombing

With the end of World War I, the reevaluation of air-power theory had fundamentally begun. Air-doctrine as it was, barely emerged from infancy following the “war to end all wars.” This fact, however, did not exempt it from strong opinions as to what the future might look like. Douhet would posit much along the lines of Mitchell that air power would play a major role in warfare—they were both correct, but not to the extent that it would render infantry and armored divisions obsolete. There was however, a paradigm shift that would take place between wars wherein the centers of gravity characterized in WWI by pursuing armies and taking ground between the trenches now focused on breaking the enemy’s morale which might very well include targeting the civilian populations. This is in keeping with Douhet, who supported such in an effort to quickly bring an enemy to the point of surrender, and thus avoid greater conflict. The right pressure exerted at the proper point and at the correct time, could produce significantly different results and exhaust fewer resources if believed that air-superiority was the answer to the modern war.

“The Strategic bombing campaign has long been a subject of intense controversy and may well remain so for years to come. Certainly the moral issue will be debated as long as morality itself lacks a confirmed definition.”

Major General Haywood S Hansell, Jr. USAF

1930’s German Air-Doctrine and its Application

By the time German forces marched into Poland on the 1st of September, 1939, the Luftwaffe had demonstrated its ability to effectively combine air and ground forces in an assault that overwhelmed Polish defenses in a matter of weeks.

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1 In speaking of the German victory over the Polish in the month of September, Dr. Murray states: “Overwhelming German
The overall unpreparedness of Western Europe in a few short years was eradicated by countermeasures and a revision of policies that in turn, overwhelmed the once predominant German air force. The moral principles guiding Allied air-doctrine also saw a transformation from the outbreak of World War II through August 1945—changes in opinion that were largely necessitated by circumstances that indicated the conflict could not be fought with the “civility” first envisaged by those fundamentally opposed to the carnality of war culminating with the Allied bombing of Dresden in 1945. For all Germany did to prepare for war and initially present as a formidable force to be reckoned with, it underestimated the Allied response as well as the duration of the war, and therefore was destined to fail.

From the outset, Germany’s opinion on the use of air-power against civilian populations—whether it included strafing or bombing—differed from that of the United States and her allies. The disparity between the two, however, would rapidly diminish with the progression of hostilities in which both the United States and Great Britain became involved.

On the same day that Germany invaded Poland, President Roosevelt appealed to several western European governments—including Germany—to refrain from targeting civilian populations. In retrospect, there is little reason to believe that Germany would have ever heeded this admonition. Luftwaffe leaders not only ignored the appeal, but revealed an indifference to the idea by deliberately targeting military forces and several populated cities in Poland. Such lack of concern for human life—in particular those individuals not related to military operations—had been demonstrated earlier in the Spanish Civil War in which Germany’s renowned Condor Legion made its debut. The German Luftwaffe went through a tactical as well as a philosophical transformation during its involvement with the Spanish Nationalists as they had no other experience as a modernized force up until that point. Previous concepts of how air support ought to have been applied were quickly reevaluated; the nature of how the aircraft were employed as well as the degree to which they were effective against enemy forces was demonstrated. Martin van Creveld says of the Spanish Civil War with reference to the Condor Legion:

This was the first time since 1918 that Luftwaffe personnel had seen any action at all. Commanders, pilots and ground crews gained experience that they, acting as instructors, were later able to pass to others. Every kind of mission was flown...The nature of the ground organization needed to support air warfare was superior, however, soon told. On the ground for the first time in modern war, the combination of armored mobile formations supported by aircraft proved devastatingly effective. Williamson Murray, Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945 (Montgomery: Air University Press, 1983), 31.

2 “When Adolf Hitler launched the Wehrmacht against Poland on September 1, 1939, to begin the Second World War, the Luftwaffe was in a considerably better position than it had been the previous fall. The staff and commanders had solved most of the teething problems that had marked a transition into a new generation of aircraft in 1937 and 1938. Air units possessed modern equipment, and anti-aircraft and airborne forces gave the Germans capabilities that other European air forces could not match. In 1939, the Luftwaffe was closer to realizing the potential of the aircraft, while the doctrine of close air support and cooperation with the army placed the German air force in the position to have a decisive impact on the coming battles beside the army’s armored forces.” Ibid., 20.


4 One may interpret air-power theorist Guilio Douhet’s proposed bombing of civilian populations as a prerequisite to engaging forces in land battles with the hopes of turning a “quick” victory. Infantry, artillery and armored forces would not need to engage if the enemy thus surrendered at the thought of being utterly destroyed by air. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 20.


6 “For the Luftwaffe, Spain was a helpful testing ground for its aircraft and tactics...the Germans learned invaluable combat lessons in Spain which they quickly absorbed into their doctrine.” Strategy for Defeat, 15.
studied in depth; in 1937-38, the legion, alternating between the northwest and the country around Madrid, was already able to display the astonishing capability for the rapid redeployment of its forces that was to serve the Luftwaffe well later on...The experience gained was invaluable.7

The Luftwaffe’s bombing of the Polish city of Wieluń, for example, was without any definitive military purpose other than to presumably make known the seriousness of Germany’s intentions. The attack on Warsaw at least had some military significance, though the fact that it was an occupied city as well seemed not to matter to the Germans.8 The Allies would learn from the Germans that the targeting of civilian populations was a strong statement to the lengths each would be compelled by the other to go with the hope of exerting pressure on the enemy to capitulate. Any criticism of Germany’s position on the issue, or even the Allies eventual practice of targeting population centers, ought to first consider the resistance of both governments to go to such measures. The United States as evidenced by Roosevelt’s warning was at first utterly opposed to bringing the war to anything other than military targets of an industrial or commercial advantage to the enemy. It may come as a surprise that the tactics applied by Germany while assisting Franco were contrary to those promoted by the Luftwaffe’s leadership just a few years prior. It is equally important to separate the military aspirations, operations, and considerations from those of the civilian population—Truman did not consult the American people prior to the events of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.


8 ”...at the conclusion of the Polish campaign, the Luftwaffe launched massive air assaults against military targets in Warsaw. In these raids, the Germans were not adverse to any collateral damage inflicted on the civilian populace.” Strategy for Defeat, 30.

In speaking of the 1935 German air force’s operation manual—Die Luftkriegfuehrung—van Creveld says:

...the manual was signed by the first chief of staff of the Luftwaffe, Gen Walther Wever. It opened by reasserting the traditional German belief that the enemy’s center of gravity lay in his armed forces and that those forces could only be defeated by the combined action of all three services...air power was to contribute to victory by attacking military objectives that were quite broadly defined. On the other hand, attacks having as their sole objective the terrorization of the enemy civilian population were explicitly forbidden as being both counterproductive and contrary to the law of war.9

Van Creveld asserts that the initial attacks on civilian populations “seem to have been the results of errors in identification or else of individual pilots getting rid of their surplus armament on their way back from missions.”10 This is debatable, as civilians were clearly targeted by air groups in Spain, and not so coincidentally, Wolfram von Richthofen—former Chief of Staff of the Condor Legion—was behind the air assault on Warsaw, and anxious to demonstrate just how destructive air-power could be by bringing the city to ruin.11 One could reasonably assume that targeting civilians was considered as part of that effort. Though he may differ in his belief that the Germans were not purposeful in their targeting of civilians, Martin Van Creveld does concede however, with respect to Warsaw, that “only toward the end of the campaign did the Germans, having repeatedly failed to induce the Polish government to lay down its arms, deliberately attack civilian targets on a large scale in order to bring about the city’s surrender.”12

9 Air Power and Maneuver Warfare, 28.

10 Ibid., 39.


12 Air Power and Maneuver Warfare, 39.
Allied Policy and the Issue of Targeting of Civilians

The Air Staff was convinced that bombers could provide a quick victory in a war by destroying the enemy’s will and capability to make war even before ground forces became heavily involved in the conflict.\textsuperscript{13}

According to Col. Thomas Cardwell, this was the prevalent attitude that US planners had towards the use of bombers and air power. Just as submarines in WWI were not the means to an end in achieving naval supremacy, bombers would not end wars before they ostensibly began. Even still, retrospect can do nothing to eradicate the thinking of those who were the architects of US air strategies in WWII. In explaining some of the thinking behind the Air War Plans Division; Plan 1 (AWPD-1), historian Russell Weigley explains:

AWPD-1 envisioned bombers relying on speed, massed formations, high altitude, their own armament and armor, and simultaneous strikes from many points to be able to penetrate deep into Germany. Its authors believed that such raids intensively bombing the selected target for six months might defeat Germany without need for a surface invasion.\textsuperscript{14}

This was at least the general consensus among the Americans with regard to the role bombers would play. Again, strategies and doctrines would change as much as some of those in power wanted them to remain the same. Change was inevitable, if not in some ways immoral.

The American air planners in AWPD-1 had rejected one major phase of Douhet’s proposed employment of air power. They did not favor a general policy of terror bombing of civilian populations. The air planners doubted on the experience of the war that terror bombing would break civilian morale as Douhet and Mitchell had predicted. Throughout the subsequent participation of the United States in the European war, Army Air Forces officers, especially General Spaatz, consistently expressed moral revulsion at the wholesale slaughter of noncombatants which terror bombing of cities obviously entailed. Strategic judgment and morality seemed to point to a common conclusion.\textsuperscript{15}

Weigley’s assessment of the US approach towards civilian bombing indicates that it was not shaped by any particular experience, but rather what appears to be a relatively strong moral opposition. The British, on the other hand—\textit{however morally predisposed towards the subject in 1939}—formulated war-time doctrine based on having experienced bombing themselves, and therefore, less apt to denounce such actions taken against the Germans. As a point of fact, the British spearheaded plans to carry-out terror bombings against non-military targets. Whether the initial raids over German cities were under the ubiquitous guise of targeting military objectives or not is irrelevant. They translated to terror bombings by virtue of the fact that civilians were calculated as collateral damage just as the Germans had themselves performed in much the same manner when bombing cities in Poland. The German attack on London, for example, was followed by a British attack on Berlin, which included more than just “military” targets. It was in some cases unavoidable, and in others curiously questionable. Hitler’s response to the British retaliatory strikes on Berlin: “\textit{If they attack our cities, we will rub out their cities from the map...}.”\textsuperscript{16} Any concern as to the commitment Britain had to seeing Germany was paid-in-kind for the bombings of London, can be answered by evaluating the reasons for having placed Sir Arthur Harris in a position of command over the bombers. He was without compunctions when it came to coordinating efforts to see that Germany was brought to a point of submission—his plans specifically called for the bombing of civilians as part of the strategy.


\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 354.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
Churchill was by no means without misgivings about terror bombing; but his somewhat sinister...scientific adviser Lord Cherwell...favored it, and together Churchill and Cherwell gave a rather free hand to its foremost apostle in the RAF, Air Marshall Sir Arthur Harris, after February 22, 1942, the head of the Bomber Command...Harris’s elevation to the leadership of Bomber Command followed immediately after and coincided in purpose with a directive to the command on February 14 to open a new offensive aimed primarily at the homes of the German people. Cherwell argued in April that this campaign, striking Germany’s fifty-eight largest cities, would render one-third of the German population homeless within fifteen months and that there was no better way to break their spirit.17

It is not so much a question of whether or not the German will was broken; it was rather a case where everything that was directed at Germany ultimately had an effect, culminating in the disintegration of Germany’s ability to continue the fight; the eventuality of Germany’s surrender as opposed to the immediate concerns of stopping her ability to persist. One may see the entire economic infrastructure of Germany as a center of gravity, or the collective morale as such—regardless, the combined efforts to collapse the industrial quarters while at the same time “punishing” Germans for having been the aggressor in another conflict was more likely than not accomplished in reflecting on six years of war. Germany was in ruins after the war, the people resolved to defeat, and the nation divided among the Allied powers—perhaps enough of a reminder that they ought not try for a third chance at dominating Europe. (to be continued)

The second part to this essay will follow in the JAN-MAR 2014 issue of the CAP National Historical Journal.

Capt Efinger is the Deputy Chief of Staff for A5 Plans, Programs and Requirements at Southeast Region HQ. He is a full-time teacher of Economics and Adjunct Professor of History at Indian River State College in Ft. Pierce, Fl.

17 Ibid, 355.
Author’s Corner:

Eyes on the Home Skies: Seventy-Five Years of the Civil Air Patrol

As the seventy-fifth anniversary closes in, a new book will be written, encompassing all of Civil Air Patrol’s history. From the development of ideas and concepts in the 1930s, to the operations of the present day, this book will be an edited work, with each chapter covering a time period written by a different CAP historian. These chapters will average around 30 pages with footnotes and illustrations. The intention here is not to create a coffee table piece but rather a quality history of value to the membership and the American public, a succinct compilation of our past to help guide us into the next seventy-five years of volunteer service.

The National Historical Editor, Lt Col Richard Mulanax, will serve as the overall editor of this volume. The goal is to seek publication through Air University Press or a suitable nationally-recognized publishing house. By early 2014, the five needed CAP historians will be selected and contacted with specifics about the research requirements and formatting. Chapter drafts must be returned by fall 2014 to allow editing and revisions, at which point the overall introduction and conclusion will be drafted. The complete manuscript will be sent to the publisher by the summer of 2015 with a scheduled publication and release of book by mid- to late 2016.

If you are interested in being the author of one of the chapters listed below not previously claimed, please contact the Chief Historian. Please be aware that this is a serious commitment to researching and writing on the part of the persons selected, and failure to meet standards or deadlines will result in removal from the project.

Forward: Preferably written by Chief of Staff of USAF or prominent federal or military official, active or retired

Introduction: Chief Historian (Maj Frank Blazich, Jr.)

Chapter 1: Background in interwar period and founding, 1930s (Capt Jill Paulson)

Chapter 2: Wartime Operations and Early Years, 1941 – 1947 (Capt Kurt Efinger)

Chapter 3: Into the Cold War, 1948 – 1960 (Col Len Blascovich)

Chapter 4: The Space Race and Changing America, 1960 – 1975


Chapter 6: End of the Cold War, 1985 – 1995

Chapter 7: Entering a New Millennium, 1995 – Present

Conclusion: National Historical Editor (Lt Col Richard Mulanax)

For further information, contact Lt Col Richard Mulanax, richmulanax@gmail.com.